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1 Introduction
Replication studies suggest that scientific misconduct plays an important role in acad-
emic research (Open Science Collaboration 2015). Many papers, such as Glaeser (2008),
identify different forms of scientific misconduct (such as data mining, data cleaning,
etc.) and discuss institutional responses to each of them. A prominent response is
improved transparency via preregistration. Preregistration requires scientists to de-
scribe the planned research activities before the project begins. This paper shows that
preregistration affects the interaction of different forms of scientific misconduct. Such
a transparency requirement discourages p-hacking, which is good, but also results in
more faked studies, which is bad.
This paper compares academic publishing with and without preregistration in a
simple model. Without preregistration, a sender (researcher) can sequentially run any
number of costly private informative experiments and selectively reveal the outcomes
to persuade a receiver (editor) to choose an action in his favor (publication). He can
also produce an uninformative manipulated outcome (for example, by faking data) at
a cost, where manipulation is possible at each experimentation history. Manipulation
costs may, for example, result from expected punishment costs. The sender prefers
publication to no publication, but less so if the results do not correctly reflect the
decision-relevant state of the world (that is, if there is a false positive). With preregis-
tration the sender can at most run one experiment and report its result truthfully, or
engage in manipulation.
With each negative experimental outcome that the sender observes, the posterior
deteriorates and the likelihood that a positive outcome is a false positive increases.
Without preregistration running several experiments is sequentially rational if experi-
mentation costs are suffi ciently low to justify gambling for a positive outcome by exper-
imentation instead of generating a positive outcome with certainty by manipulation. If
the sender, who dislikes publishing a false positive to some extent, observes suffi ciently
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many negative experimental outcomes, then unsuccessful stopping may be better than
further experimentation or manipulation.
Preregistration encourages uninformative manipulation as follows. If this require-
ment is introduced, then gambling for a positive outcome is not possible after observing
a negative outcome of the first experiment. Manipulation at this history may be bet-
ter than unsuccessful stopping, since the likelihood of a false positive is moderate. A
switch from informative experimentation with eventual unsuccessful stopping without
preregistration to uninformative manipulation with preregistration may, thus, occur.
On the other hand, if the sender eventually manipulates without preregistration,
then he also eventually manipulates with such a requirement. Again, a false positive is
less likely after observing a single negative experimental outcome than after observing
more than one such outcome. Hence, if eventual manipulation is attractive at a history
that contains many negative outcomes, then it is even more attractive at the outset or
after observing a single such outcome.
Preregistration, thus, may encourage a switch from experimentation with unsuccess-
ful stopping to eventual manipulation, but the reverse does not happen. It follows that
there are more researcher types that manipulate with preregistration than without this
requirement, which is detrimental for the quality of academic publishing. A positive
aspect of preregistration is that it eliminates excessive private experimentation. The
quality of academic publishing clearly improves if a sender type does not manipulate
with preregistration. From the above it follows that such a type also does not manipu-
late in the absence of preregistration. Whether additional manipulation or a reduction
of private experimentation overall matters more for the publication quality depends on




This paper is part of the economic literature on academic research (as, for example,
Stern 2004; Aghion et al. 2008; Lewis and Ottaviani 2008; Olszewski and Sandroni
2011; Brodeur et al. 2016). Scientific misconduct, an important aspect in this liter-
ature, is commonly viewed as the result of incentives that researchers face (Glaeser
2008). Many scientists, as, for example, Ioannidis et al. (2014), advocate greater re-
search transparency to reduce publication of false positives. Preregistration reduces a
researcher’s ability to cherry-pick hypotheses, data analyses or a good dataset (Coff-
man and Niederle 2015). However, preregistration is not uncontroversial in the scientific
community (Coffman and Niederle 2015). A common criticism is that it discourages
exploratory research or the use of novel research designs. Miguel et al. (2014) disagree
and point out that prespecification frees exploratory analysis from being portrayed as
formal hypothesis testing. Olken (2015) argues that empirical papers in economics not
only investigate the result of a treatment, but also study the mechanisms underlying the
treatment. The results then quickly become too complex / costly to specify in advance.
Libgober (2020) shows that a receiver may prefer partial transparency (where only some
aspects of an experiment are preregistered) to full transparency, as the sender may have
to compensate in a dimension that is observable in order to credibly convey that he
has chosen a not that detrimental action in the unobservable dimension. The current
paper formally derives benefits (a reduction of excessive private experimentation) and
downsides (additional manipulation) of preregistration.
In this paper the information that is used for persuasion can be acquired by exper-
imentation. Therefore, this paper is part of the endogenous persuasion literature (as,
for example, Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Henry and Ottaviani 2019).1 It belongs
to a branch of this literature in which experimentation occurs in private (as in Bro-
1The paper relates to strategic experimentation in “bandit problems”(see Bergemann and Välimäki
2008, for a survey). Experimentation is also investigated in the literature on the classical problem of
sequential analysis (as in Wald 1947; Moscarini and Smith 2001).
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cas and Carillo 2007; Henry 2009). Private experimentation with selective information
disclosure is a natural assumption for many scientific methods, such as psychological
experiments or regressions on a private database. Some papers, as the present one,
assume that the sender’s decision to continue experimenting is history-dependent (for
example, Celik 2003; Felgenhauer and Schulte 2014). A consequence of this assumption
is that the receiver in general cannot deduce the actual number of experiments and com-
munication may not be fully revealing.2 Closely related is Felgenhauer and Xu (2020),
in the following FX. Their model gives the sender the additional option to manipulate
at any experimentation history. They study how different face value requirements for
persuasion (such as different p-value requirements for publication) affect the real value
of a disclosed experimental outcome. The current paper uses the framework in FX. The
contribution is to introduce preregistration and to compare the sender’s behavior and
welfare with and without preregistration.3
An implicit assumption in this paper is that the researcher has a less strong incentive
to manipulate, the more strongly he believes that the claim he wants to publish is false.
Without the dependence of the researcher’s behavior on the distribution of the states
(whether the claim is true or false), the level of manipulation would be the same with
and without preregistration. In the literature on the cost of lying, Abeler et al. (2019)
study an experiment in which each subject privately observes a state (good or bad),
which can be misreported, and there is a monetary incentive to claim that the state is
good, regardless of the actual state. They find that the more likely it is that the state
is good, the more subjects misreport a bad state, that is, the propensity to lie depends
on the distribution of states. Hence, there is empirical evidence that the incentive to
misreport is distribution-dependent.
2There can be a commitment problem if experimentation is not history-dependent. At some ex-
perimentation history the sender may anticipate that persuasion is impossible by running the final
experiments. Given that experimentation occurs in private, it is then not clear why he should run
further experiments. In Baliga and Ely (2016) instead, the receiver’s decisions are history-dependent.
3Without preregistration, the optimal face value requirement for a particular sender type in general
cannot ensure that all types run at most one experiment.
5
Finally, uninformative manipulation (such as faking data) is related to the cheap
talk literature (for example, Crawford and Sobel 1982). Strulovici (2017) investigates
the effects of compensation schemes on experimentation and manipulation. The current
paper instead assumes an informal relationship between the sender and the receiver,
and, hence, no such compensation scheme. There are papers in the economic literature
on academic research that attach a different meaning to the term “manipulation”. For
example, Di Tillio, Ottaviani and Sørenson (2017) study manipulation and selective
disclosure in a randomized controlled trial (RCT). Manipulation occurs via selective
sampling and selective assignment, such that a manipulated RCT is still informative.
3 Model
The model describes a scenario where a researcher can publish a paper that makes an
interesting claim, but not the opposite of this claim. The claim can be true or false,
which cannot be directly observed. The researcher needs a supporting argument for a
publication. Arguments can be generated in private by running informative experiments
or by uninformative manipulation and they can be selectively revealed.
The assumptions are as follows. There is a sender (researcher) and a receiver (edi-
tor). The receiver chooses a ∈ {a1, a2}, where a1 is “publication”and a2 is “rejection”.
There is an unknown state ω ∈ {ω1, ω2}, where ω1 means that the researcher’s claim
is “true”and ω2 means that it is “false”. The prior belief is prob{ω = ω1} = µ0, with
µ0 ∈ (0, 1/2]. The claim is more likely to be false, and, hence, “surprising”.
Payoffs The sender prefers a1 in each state, but less in state ω2 (published claim
is false) than in state ω1 (published claim is true).4 Sender type θ ∈ [0, 1], where θ
reflects how much he dislikes to publish a false claim, obtains gross utility:5
4In Herresthal (2017), who compares private and public experimentation without the option to
manipulate, the utility from choosing a particular action also depends on the state.
5The sender’s gross utility is zero if he never stops experimenting. Experimentation and manipula-
tion costs are subtracted from the sender’s gross utility.
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ω = ω1 ω = ω2
a = a1 1 θ
a = a2 0 0
The receiver obtains utility 1 if she chooses a1 in state ω1 (published claim is true)
and −1 if she chooses a1 in state ω2 (published claim is a false positive). Otherwise,
her utility is 0. In the following, the receiver’s ex ante utility is called the “publication
quality”.
Experimentation and manipulation The sender can run any number of ex-
periments without preregistration and at most one experiment with this requirement.
Experiment j’s outcome is σj ∈ {s1, s2}, where s1 is called a “positive”outcome and s2 a
“negative”outcome. An outcome correctly reflects the state with exogenous probability
π ∈ (1/2, 1]. That is, outcome si realizes in state ωi with probability π. The probability
that outcome si realizes in state ωj, with i 6= j, is 1− π. The sender privately observes
the experimentation history ht = {σj}j=1,...,t. The history at the outset is h0 = ∅.
Denote by µt the posterior probability prob{ω = ω1 | ht} if ht does not contain positive
outcomes. Each experiment costs cE > 0. Let cE ≤ µ1π + (1 − µ1)(1 − π)θ. As will
be seen later, at higher costs the sender does not want to continue experimenting after
observing a single negative outcome and preregistration is not binding. The sender
may also manipulate in private at costs cM > 0. Manipulation yields an uninformative
outcome s1.
Sender’s message The sender sends a feasible message m ∈ {s1, s2, ∅}. Message
m = si is feasible if si stems from experimentation or manipulation.
Receiver’s decision rule The receiver chooses a1 if m = s1 and a2, otherwise.6
6Endogenizing the receiver’s behavior, as in Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) and Felgenhauer and
Loerke (2017), complicates the analysis without substantially changing the results. Note, though, that
“rejection”after observing a positive outcome would yield a higher publication quality if a sender type
eventually manipulates or if the quality of the experiments is very low.
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Timing Without preregistration the sender makes the history-dependent choice to
conduct a further experiment or to stop experimenting at each experimentation history
that he observes. After stopping he decides whether to manipulate. He then sends a
message m to the receiver, who finally chooses a. The timing with preregistration is
the same, but the sender may run at most one experiment.
4 Analysis
4.1 Experimentation, Manipulation and the Publication Qual-
ity Without Preregistration
It is sequentially rational for the sender to stop experimenting at a history ht that
contains a positive outcome.7 He then obtains his preferred decision a1 by sending
message m = s1. It may be sequentially rational to continue experimenting or to
manipulate if ht does not contain a positive outcome.
Suppose manipulation is not possible (or manipulation costs are suffi ciently high
such that it is not sequentially rational for the sender to manipulate). The sender’s
payoff from running one further experiment at some history ht that does not contain a
positive outcome and then stopping after either outcome is
EUE1t = µt(π − cE) + (1− µt)((1− π)θ − cE). (1)
Term (π − cE) is the expected payoff in state ω1, which realizes with probability
µt. In this term, π is the probability that the experiment yields a positive outcome,
implying gross utility 1. Experimentation costs cE have to be subtracted (in each state).
Term (1− µt)((1− π)θ − cE) refers to state ω2 and is interpreted analogously.
It is not sequentially rational to continue experimenting if EUE1t < 0. Suppose there
7The analysis in this subsection directly follows FX.
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is a finite t at which this inequality holds and denote by TE the lowest t at which this
inequality holds. The sender’s continuation utility at some history ht, with t < TE, is
denoted by EUEt .
8 If EUE1t > 0 at all posteriors (in particular at the “worst”posterior
µ = 0), then the sender never stops experimenting unsuccessfully.
Now suppose that manipulation is also possible. Manipulation yields a positive
outcome in each state and costs cM . As the sender’s gross payoff from a1 is 1 in state
ω1 and θ in state ω2, his continuation utility from manipulation at t is
EUMt = µt(1− cM) + (1− µt)(θ − cM). (2)
It is sequentially rational for the sender to experiment with eventual unsuccessful
stopping at TE (without any manipulation) if EUEt ≥ EUMt for all t < TE and EUMTE ≤
0. Otherwise, eventual manipulation occurs at some TM , with TM ≤ TE. Both, EUEt
and EUMt decrease in the number of negative outcomes that history ht contains, that
is, they decrease if µt decreases.
The sender’s behavior affects the publication quality, which matters for the welfare
analysis below. If the sender eventually manipulates or never stops experimenting
unsuccessfully, then the publication quality is µ0 − (1− µ0).9 Suppose the sender runs
at most T experiments without manipulation. Action a1 is chosen if not all of these
experiments’outcomes are negative. This happens with probability (1 − (1 − π)T ) in
state ω1 and with probability (1− πT ) in state ω2, yielding receiver utilities 1 and −1
in the respective states. Thus, the publication quality is
µ0(1− (1− π)T )− (1− µ0)(1− πT ). (3)
Lemma 1 (i) Suppose the sender runs at most T ≥ 2 experiments without manipu-
8A formula for EUEt is provided in the appendix.
9The receiver chooses a1 in each state. Action a1 is only correct in state ω1 (yielding receiver utility
1), which ex ante realizes with probability µ0. This action yields utility −1 in the other state, which
realizes with probability 1− µ0.
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lation. A decrease of T by one increases the publication quality. (ii) The publication
quality from experimentation with unsuccessful stopping is higher than from manipula-
tion or experimentation without unsuccessful stopping.
Thus, less excessive private experimentation improves the publication quality (part
(i)). The quality of a publication is higher if it is based on an informative revealed
outcome than in case it is based on an uninformative revealed outcome (part (ii)).
4.2 Comparison of the Sender’s Behavior With and Without
Preregistration
Suppose that without preregistration the sender eventually manipulates at some TM >
1. We have EUMTM > 0, as otherwise it is not sequentially rational to manipulate at TM .
The sender then also eventually manipulates with preregistration either at the outset or





(due to µ0 > µ1 > µTM ) and as the continuation utility from stopping unsuccessfully at
t = 1 is 0.
Suppose that without preregistration the sender experiments and does not manip-





may now either run a single experiment and stop after either outcome without manipu-
lation, or he may manipulate either at the outset or after observing a negative outcome
of the first experiment.
Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of these effects.
Proposition 1 Any sender type that eventually manipulates without preregistration
also eventually manipulates with such a requirement. A sender type that does not even-
tually manipulate without preregistration (i) does not manipulate with such a require-
ment if EUE10 ≥ EUM0 (⇔ µ0(π − cE) + (1 − µ0)((1 − π)θ − cE) ≥ µ0(1 − cM) + (1 −
µ0)(θ − cM)) and EUM1 ≤ 0 (⇔ µ1(1 − cM) + (1 − µ1)(θ − cM) ≤ 0) (ii) eventually
manipulates with preregistration if EUE10 < EU
M




As an illustration that the introduction of preregistration may induce a switch from
experimenting with unsuccessful stopping to eventual manipulation, consider parame-
ters (µ0 = 0.5, π = 0.8, cE = 0.15, cM = 0.75, θ = 0.7). For these parameters
the sender’s benefit from manipulation after observing a negative outcome of the first
experiment is greater than zero. However, experimentation costs are suffi ciently low
compared to manipulation costs to justify the gamble to obtain a positive outcome
by chance via further experimentation. With each negative experimental outcome the
posterior is depressed, which also makes manipulation less attractive and worse than
stopping unsuccessfully at any t > 1. The sender eventually stops experimenting unsuc-
cessfully without manipulation (at TE = 4). With preregistration, further experiments
are not possible after observing a negative outcome of the first experiment. Since the
benefit from manipulation at this history is greater than zero, the sender switches to
eventual manipulation if preregistration is introduced.
4.3 The Impact of Preregistration on Welfare
The components that matter for welfare are the publication quality, the ex ante prob-
ability that decision a1 is made (in the following called the “publication probability”)
and expected costs. Each of the three components of welfare is first studied separately
and then overall welfare is discussed.
Publication quality If the sender eventually manipulates with and without pre-
registration, then the publication quality in both cases is the same. If the introduction of
such a requirement encourages a switch from experimenting with eventual unsuccessful
stopping to manipulation, then the publication quality strictly deteriorates according
to Lemma 1 (ii).10 For example, for the above parameters (µ0 = 0.5, π = 0.8, cE = 0.15,
cM = 0.75, θ = 0.7), introducing preregistration causes a drop of the publication qual-
ity from 0.204 to 0 due to the switch from experimentation to manipulation. If there
10If there is a switch from experimenting without unsuccessful stopping to eventual manipulation,
then the publication quality is the same.
11
is experimentation (without eventual manipulation) with and without preregistration,
then the publication quality improves, as there is a reduction of excessive private exper-
imentation according to Lemma 1 (i). The impact of preregistration on the publication
quality depends on how opportunistic the sender type is.




} such that with
preregistration the publication quality is (i) higher than without such a requirement if
θ ≤ θ̃ and (ii) weakly lower than without such a requirement, otherwise.




1 = 0 for θ
(see Proposition 1). According to the corollary, preregistration improves the publica-
tion quality if the sender is suffi ciently sincere and it weakly deteriorates the publica-
tion quality if the sender is suffi ciently opportunistic. For a sincere type preregistration
reduces detrimental excessive private experimentation and does not encourage manip-
ulation. An opportunistic type eventually manipulates with preregistration, but not
necessarily without this requirement.11
Publication probability The publication probability is one if the sender manip-
ulates with and without preregistration. If the sender does not manipulate in both
cases, then preregistration reduces the publication probability, as it reduces excessive
experimentation and thereby the chance to generate a positive outcome. If the introduc-
tion of preregistration instead induces a switch from experimentation with unsuccessful
stopping to eventual manipulation, then the publication probability increases with pre-
registration. In the former case the publication probability is smaller than one, but in
the latter case the sender always produces a positive outcome.
Expected costs Preregistration is a constraint for the sender. With preregistration
11An increase of θ̃ due to a parameter change implies that more types become “sincere”. θ̃ increases
in cM , as experimentation becomes more attractive. Similarly, θ̃ decreases in cE . With a higher π it
is ex ante less likely to find a positive outcome by experimentation if the prior µ0 is low (gambling by
experimentation is less profitable) and more likely if µ0 is high (gambling is more profitable). Hence,
whether an increase of π increases or decreases θ̃ depends on the size of µ0 (see appendix).
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he is weakly worse offthan without such a requirement. Suppose the sender manipulates
with and without preregistration. As the publication probability is the same and the
sender is weakly worse off with preregistration, expected costs with preregistration
have to be weakly higher than without preregistration. With preregistration expected
experimentation costs decrease and expected manipulation costs increase. If the sender
does not manipulate with and without preregistration, then expected experimentation
costs are lower with this requirement, as it prevents excessive experimentation. If the
sender switches from experimentation to manipulation in response to preregistration,
then again, the publication probability increases. As the sender is weakly worse off
with the preregistration constraint, this implies that expected costs have to increase
as well in order to overcompensate the higher publication probability (where expected
experimentation costs decrease and expected manipulation costs increase).
The following proposition summarizes these effects.
Proposition 2 If a sender type eventually manipulates without preregistration, then
the introduction of such a requirement does not change the publication quality and the
publication probability, but it increases expected costs. If a sender type experiments
without preregistration, then the introduction of such a requirement improves the pub-
lication quality, but it lowers the publication probability and expected costs under the
conditions of Proposition 1 (i), EUE10 ≥ EUM0 and EUM1 ≤ 0. If a sender type exper-
iments without preregistration, then the introduction of such a requirement lowers the
publication quality, but it increases the publication probability and expected costs under





Let welfare be a linear combination of the above components, with λR being the
weight attached to the receiver’s ex ante utility (the publication quality), λP being the
weight for the publication probability and λC being the weight for expected costs, with
λR + λP + λC = 1.
For any weights, welfare is weakly lower with preregistration if the sender manip-
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ulates without preregistration. The reason is that, according to Proposition 2, the
publication quality and the publication probability are not affected by preregistration,
but expected costs are higher with preregistration. Suppose in the following that the
sender does not manipulate without preregistration.
Consider first the case where the sender and the receiver have the same weight in
the welfare function (λR = λP = λC). If the sender manipulates with preregistration,
then both, the sender and the receiver are worse off with this requirement: the sender,
as preregistration is a constraint, and the receiver, as manipulation yields the lowest
publication quality. Suppose the sender does not manipulate with preregistration. The
receiver prefers preregistration, as it prevents excessive private experimentation, but
the sender dislikes this constraint. The size of this conflict of interest depends on
the sender’s opportunism: the more opportunistic the sender is, the more excessively
he is willing to experiment without preregistration (which he only does because it
gives him additional utility), but which is worse for the receiver, as more excessive
private experimentation depresses the publication quality. The receiver gains more from
preregistration, the more opportunistic the sender is, but the sender then loses more
with this constraint.12 In the appendix it is shown that with suffi ciently low sender
opportunism, welfare is maximized with preregistration, but with high opportunism
welfare can be maximized without this requirement. This point also depends on the
specification of the receiver’s preferences. For example, if the editor’s disutility from
publishing a false positive is suffi ciently high instead, then welfare is maximized with
preregistration even if the researcher is completely opportunistic.
The case where the sender is suffi ciently small such that the impact of his payoff
on welfare is negligible can be approximated by λR = 1. The effects of preregistration
on welfare then directly follow from Proposition 2. An extreme case is λR = 0 and
λP = λC , where welfare corresponds to the sender’s payoff. Introducing preregistration
12In addition, the sender’s gross utility per se increases in θ and, thus, by construction, his relevance
in the welfare function.
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lowers welfare, as the sender is weakly worse off with this constraint. If welfare is
some convex combination of the sender’s and the receiver’s payoff, with λR ∈ (0, 1) and
λP = λC , and the sender does not manipulate with preregistration, then the effect of
this requirement on welfare clearly depends on the size of λR, due to the conflict of
interest between the sender and the receiver. If the sender instead manipulates with
preregistration, then, analogous to above, the sender and the receiver both prefer no
preregistration. In the context of this model’s interpretation, the sender’s gross payoff
increases in the probability of a publication, regardless of whether it is true or false.
It may be viewed as reasonable to attach a low weight to the sender’s gross payoff.
Let us approximate this case by setting λP = 0. Now only the publication quality and
expected costs matter for welfare.
Proposition 3 Let λP = 0. If a sender type experiments without preregistration, then
welfare is higher with such a requirement under the conditions of Proposition 1 (i),






Under the conditions of Proposition 1 (i) the sender also experiments with prereg-
istration, which increases the publication quality and reduces expected costs according
to Proposition 2, and, hence, preregistration improves welfare if λP = 0. Under the
conditions of Proposition 1 (ii) the sender manipulates with preregistration, which de-
creases the publication quality and increases expected costs according to Proposition
2, and, hence, preregistration deteriorates welfare if λP = 0. Preregistration only im-
proves welfare if the sender does not manipulate with this requirement. According to
Proposition 1 (i), this is the case if manipulation costs are suffi ciently high such that
manipulation after observing a negative outcome of the first experiment is worse for
the sender than stopping unsuccessfully (EUM1 ≤ 0) and if experimentation costs are
suffi ciently low such that running a single experiment (gambling for a positive outcome)
is better than manipulating at the outset (positive outcome with certainty), that is, if
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EUE10 ≥ EUM0 .
5 Conclusion
This paper studies benefits and downsides of preregistration in a simple model in which
decision-relevant information can be acquired via sequential private experimentation
and where in addition uninformative manipulation may occur. Introducing a prereg-
istration requirement may cause a switch from informative experimentation to unin-
formative manipulation, but not vice versa. A researcher who dislikes to publish a
false positive to some extent, but still eventually manipulates without preregistration
at a poor posterior, also manipulates with preregistration at a better prior / posterior
where a false positive is less likely. A positive aspect of preregistration is that it reduces
excessive private experimentation for a sender who does not manipulate with such a
requirement. Such a sender also does not manipulate without preregistration.
Whether preregistration improves the quality of the academic publishing process
depends on the opportunism of the sender, the precision of the experiments and ma-
nipulation and experimentation costs. Some of these parameters are contingent on the
scientific method. For example, experimentation costs may be influenced by method
specific restrictions on admissible arguments (Felgenhauer and Schulte, 2014). For a
given method, experimentation costs should also decrease over time due to technological
progress and methods may evolve over time. The likelihood of replication studies should
influence manipulation costs. The level of opportunism should depend on institutional
incentives. A proposal to introduce preregistration should take these parameters into
account and include measures (such as restrictions on admissible arguments) to keep
them in a range where preregistration is indeed beneficial. Actions to circumvent pre-
registration, such as pre-trials, should also be made expensive.
The paper is framed in the context of academic publishing. Another important
application is the approval process for new drugs in the pharmaceutical industry, where
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it is often legally required to preregister medical experiments. The effects identified
here can be directly applied to the preregistration of such experiments.
A measure (such as improved transparency) to reduce a particular kind of scientific
misconduct (such as p-hacking) can encourage other forms of scientific misconduct
(such as faking data). Future work could further explore the interdependencies between
different forms of scientific misconduct (possibly contingent on the scientific method)
and appropriate institutional responses.
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APPENDIX
Continuation utility from experimenting The sender’s continuation utility
from experimenting without manipulation at some history ht, with t < TE, that does




(1− π)n(π − cE) + (1− µt)
TE−t−1∑
n=0








(1 − π)n(π − cE). Component
∑TE−t−1
n=0
(1 − π)nπ is the
probability at t to find a positive outcome (yielding gross utility 1) in state ω1 if the
sender overall runs at most TE experiments.13 Component
∑TE−t−1
n=0
(1 − π)ncE are




πn((1− π)θ − cE) is the continuation utility in state ω2.
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) In (3), term (1− (1− π)T ) increases in T and −(1− πT )
decreases in T . The critical case is µ0 = 1/2, in which case the publication quality
simplifies to 1
2
(1 − (1 − π)T ) − 1
2
(1 − πT ) = 1
2
(πT − (1 − π)T ). Now it is shown that
decreasing T by 1 increases the publication quality, that is 1
2
(πT −(1−π)T ) ≤ 1
2
(πT−1−
(1 − π)T−1), which is equivalent to 1
2
((πT−1 + (1 − π)T−1)π − (1 − π)T−1) ≤ 1
2
(πT−1 −





13For example, if t = 0 and TE = 2, then
∑TE−t−1
n=0
(1 − π)nπ =(1 − π)0π + (1 − π)π, where
(1 − π)0π = π is the probability that the first experiment yields a positive outcome in state ω1,
and (1 − π)π is the probability that the first experiment yields a negative outcome and the second




(1 − π)nπ = (1 − π)0π = π, which is the probability that the next (and final)
experiment yields a positive outcome at this history in state ω1.
14For example, if t = 0 and TE = 2, then
∑TE−t−1
n=0
(1 − π)ncE = (1 − π)0cE + (1 − π)cE , where
(1−π)0cE = cE is the cost of running the first experiment in state ω1, and (1−π)cE is the probability
that the first experiment yields a negative outcome (only in this case the second experiment is run)
times the costs of the second experiment in state ω1. After the first experiment we have t = 1 and
TE = 2, which yields
∑TE−t−1
n=0
(1 − π)ncE = (1 − π)0cE = cE , which is the cost from running the
second (and final) experiment at this history in state ω1.
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As π ∈ (1/2, 1] by assumption, we have π





T−1 if T ≥ 2.
By assumption, cE ≤ µ1π + (1 − µ1)(1 − π)θ, which implies T ≥ 2 if the sender does
not manipulate.
(ii) It has to be shown that µ0(1 − (1 − π)T ) − (1 − µ0)(1 − πT ) ≥ µ0 − (1 − µ0).




, which is true as π ∈ (1/2, 1] and µ0 ∈ (0, 1/2].
Q.E.D.
The effect of π on sender type θ̃ in Corollary 1: Let parameters be such









consider a marginal increase of π (the precision of the experiment) in which case this







(where experimentation may only be sequentially
rational if cM > cE). An increase of π increases θ̃ if µ0 is greater than (cM − cE) and it
decreases this type otherwise.
The effect of the sender’s opportunism on welfare if λR = λP = λC: Suppose
the sender does not manipulate with preregistration. It is now shown that with suffi -
ciently low sender opportunism welfare is maximized with preregistration, but with high
opportunism welfare can be maximized without this requirement. Let cE ∈ (0, 1− π).
Assumption cE < 1−π guarantees that the sender experiments until he finds a positive
outcome if θ = 1: the sender does not stop experimenting unsuccessfully even if he
knows that the state is adverse, as µ(π− cE) + (1− µ)((1− π)θ− cE) > 0 simplifies to
cE < 1− π if µ = 0 and θ = 1.
Consider the highest level of opportunism θ = 1. The sum of the receiver’s and
the sender’s ex ante utilities without preregistration, where the sender does not stop
experimenting unsuccessfully and presents a positive outcome regardless of the state,












1−π )cE follows from EU
E
0 in (4) with θ = 1 and TE →∞. With preregistration
it is µ0(1− (1− π))− (1− µ0)(1− π) + µ0π + (1− µ0)(1− π)− cE = 2πµ0 − cE. We
19




1−π )cE > 2πµ0 − cE if cE is suffi ciently low, as π < 1. Hence, for a
high level of sender opportunism, no preregistration can maximize welfare.
Next, consider a low level of opportunism. For each cE, there is a θ suffi ciently low
such that TE = 2 and he is just indifferent between running the second experiment and
stopping unsuccessfully after a negative outcome of the first experiment (which is the
case if µ1(π − cE) + (1 − µ1)((1 − π)θ − cE) = 0). The sender’s ex ante utility with
and without preregistration is, thus, the same. As the receiver is better offwith prereg-
istration, where a revealed positive outcome is based on a single experiment (and not
potentially two experiments without preregistration), this requirement maximizes wel-
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